

NDT Master Bibliography

Governing human-readable projection of Source Register 2.15

Version: 1.8 **Date:** 3 September 2026 **Status:** Unratified RC3 author working projection; unmerged and unreleased

Machine-readable authority: NDT_SOURCE_REGISTER_2_15.csv **Authority SHA-256:**

85fef04541b869f1dbf602af2049b26cc031b37edec73ea8c56d50a9cbc1f2a1

This bibliography contains all 77 governed source units in Source Register 2.15: 9 NDT-corpus units, 66 primary-external units, and 2 secondary-source units. Literature Review 0.13 and Dataset 1.20 are governed projections of the same source register; neither is an independent bibliography. Document-specific reference lists contain only works cited in those documents.

A. NDT source corpus

S25 Bree Beal (2020), “What Are the Irreducible Basic Elements of Morality?” <https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691619867106>

S26 Bree Beal (2021), “The Nonmoral Conditions of Moral Cognition.” <https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2021.1942811>

S27 Beal & Gogia (2021), “Cognition in Moral Space: A Minimal Model.” <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2021.103134>

S28 Bree Beal (2022), “The Polyphony Principle.” <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X2200108X>

S29 Beal, B. L. (2018). Raskolnikov's Confession: A Dostoevskian Model of Moral Psychology [Doctoral dissertation, Emory University]. <https://etd.library.emory.edu/concern/etds/6969z078d?locale=en>

S30 Beal, B. (2025, January 20). The Is-to-Ought Model of Moral Cognition. Bree's Substack. <https://breebeal.substack.com/p/the-isought-model-of-moral-cognition>

S31 Beal, B. (2025, January 31). On the Relation Between Moral Philosophy and Moral Psychology. Bree's Substack. <https://breebeal.substack.com/p/on-the-relation-between-moral-philosophy>

S32 Beal, B. (2026). A Thousand Ramanujans. Bree's Substack. <https://breebeal.substack.com/p/a-thousand-ramanujans>

S60 Bree Beal and Joshua Rottman (2024), Nonmoral Beliefs Beat Values (submitted manuscript). earlier-ndt-work/2024-nonmoral-beliefs-beat-values.pdf

B. Primary external sources

S01 Aristotle, De Motu Animalium, Part 7 (trans. Farquharson). https://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/motion_animals.html

S02 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 2.3.3.3, SBN 414. <https://davidhume.org/texts/t/2/3/3>

S03 David Makinson & Leendert van der Torre (2007), “What is Input/Output Logic?” <https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07122.32>

S04 John R. Searle (1964), “How to Derive Ought from Is.” <https://doi.org/10.2307/2183201>

S05 Phan Minh Dung (1995), “On the Acceptability of Arguments and Its Fundamental Role in Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Logic Programming and n-Person Games,” Artificial Intelligence 77(2), 321–357, Definition 20, p. 329. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0004-3702\(94\)00041-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/0004-3702(94)00041-X)

S06 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. I, §II. <https://www.laits.utexas.edu/poltheory/bentham/ipml/ipml.c01.html>

S07 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Formula of Humanity. https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Groundwork_of_the_Metaphysics_of_Morals

S08 W. D. Ross (1930), The Right and the Good, ch. 2, p. 28. <https://www.ditext.com/ross/right2.html>

S09 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Books I–II (trans. W. D. Ross). https://people.bu.edu/wwildman/courses/wphil/readings/wphil_rdg09_nichomacheanethics_entire.htm

S10 Virginia Held (1995), “The Meshing of Care and Justice.” <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1995.tb01374.x>

S11 T. M. Scanlon (1998), What We Owe to Each Other, ch. 5, p. 189. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv134vmrn.8>

- S13** Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I–II, q.94, a.2. <https://www.newadvent.org/summa/2094.htm>
- S15** Jonathan Dancy (2004), *Ethics Without Principles*, ch. 1, p. 7. <https://academic.oup.com/book/1580/chapter/141077708>
- S16** Graham et al. (2011), “Mapping the Moral Domain,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 101(2), 366–385, quote p. 366. <https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3116962/>
- S17** Schein & Gray (2018), “The Theory of Dyadic Morality,” *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 22(1), 32–70, quote p. 32. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868317698288>
- S18** Elliot Turiel (1983), *The Development of Social Knowledge: Morality and Convention*, ch. 4, p. 61. https://archive.org/details/isbn_0521273056
- S19** Curry, Mullins & Whitehouse (2019), “Is It Good to Cooperate?” <https://doi.org/10.1086/701478>
- S20** Rai & Fiske (2011), “Moral Psychology Is Relationship Regulation,” *Psychological Review* 118(1), 57–75, p. 58. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/49764236_Moral_Psychology_Is_Relationship_Regulation_Moral_Motives_for_U
[nity_Hierarchy_Equality_and_Proportionality](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/49764236_Moral_Psychology_Is_Relationship_Regulation_Moral_Motives_for_U)
- S21** Kleiman-Weiner, Saxe & Tenenbaum (2017), “Learning a Commonsense Moral Theory,” *Cognition* 167, 107–123, author manuscript p. 2. <https://faculty.washington.edu/maxkw/publication/kleiman-2017-learning/kleiman-2017-learning.pdf>
- S22** Friston et al. (2017), “Active Inference: A Process Theory.” https://doi.org/10.1162/NECO_a_00912
- S23** Bai et al. (2022), “Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedback.” <https://arxiv.org/abs/2212.08073>
- S24** Hendrycks et al. (2021), “Aligning AI With Shared Human Values.” <https://arxiv.org/abs/2008.02275>
- S33** Barbara Herman (1993), *The Practice of Moral Judgment*, ‘On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty,’ pp. 1–22, quote p. 21. <https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674697188>
- S34** Nomy Arpaly (2003), *Unprincipled Virtue*, ‘Moral Worth,’ pp. 67–116, quote p. 72. <https://doi.org/10.1093/0195152042.003.0003>
- S35** Julia Markovits (2010), ‘Acting for the Right Reasons,’ *The Philosophical Review* 119(2), 201–242, quote p. 202. <https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2009-037>
- S36** Paulina Sliwa (2016), ‘Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge,’ *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 93(2), 393–418, quote p. 393. <https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12195>
- S37** Hart, H. L. A., & Honore, T. (1985). *Causation in the Law* (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press. <https://global.oup.com/academic/product/causation-in-the-law-9780198254744>
- S38** Richard W. Wright (1985), ‘Causation in Tort Law,’ *California Law Review* 73(6), 1735–1828, quote p. 1774. <https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38Q15Q>
- S39** Joseph Y. Halpern & Judea Pearl (2005), ‘Causes and Explanations: A Structural-Model Approach. Part I: Causes,’ *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 56(4), 843–887. <https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axi147>
- S40** Sydney Levine, Nick Chater, Joshua B. Tenenbaum & Fiery Cushman (2026), ‘Resource-rational contractualism: A triple theory of moral cognition,’ *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 49, e133, manuscript p. 13. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X24001067>
- S41** Aida Ramezani & Yang Xu (2025), ‘Moral Association Graph: A Cognitive Model for Automated Moral Inference,’ *Topics in Cognitive Science* 17(1), 120–138, quote p. 120. <https://doi.org/10.1111/tops.12774>
- S42** John L. Pollock (1987), “Defeasible Reasoning,” *Cognitive Science* 11(4), 481–518, p. 484. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15516709cog1104_4
- S43** John F. Horty (2012), *Reasons as Defaults*, Oxford University Press, abstract. <https://academic.oup.com/book/9900>
- S44** Mikhail Bakhtin (1984), *Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics*, ed. and trans. Caryl Emerson, ch. 1, p. 6. <https://doi.org/10.5749/j.ctt22727z1>
- S45** J. L. Mackie (1977), *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*, ch. 1, §2, p. 17. <https://archive.org/details/ethics-inventing-right-and-wrong>
- S46** G. E. M. Anscombe (1957), *Intention*, §33, p. 60. <https://archive.org/details/intention0000unse>
- S47** Donald Davidson (1978), “Intending,” in *The Essential Davidson*, p. 132. <https://dokumen.pub/the-essential-davidson-0199288860-0199288852.html>

- S48** David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 3.1.1.27, SBN 469–470. <https://davidhume.org/texts/t/3/1/1>
- S49** David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 2.3.3.8, SBN 417. <https://davidhume.org/texts/t/2/3/3>
- S50** Jonathan Haidt & Craig Joseph (2004), “Intuitive Ethics,” *Daedalus* 133(4), 55–66, p. 60. <https://www.amacad.org/publication/intuitive-ethics>
- S51** Graham et al. (2013), “Moral Foundations Theory: The Pragmatic Validity of Moral Pluralism,” *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 47, 55–130, p. 63. https://bpb-us-e2.wpmucdn.com/sites.uci.edu/dist/1/863/files/2020/06/Graham-et-al-2013.AESP_.pdf
- S52** Chelsea Schein & Kurt Gray (2018), “The Theory of Dyadic Morality,” *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 22(1), 32–70, p. 33. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1088868317698288>
- S53** Elliot Turiel (1983), *The Development of Social Knowledge: Morality and Convention*, ch. 4, p. 64. https://archive.org/details/isbn_0521273056
- S54** Tage Shakti Rai & Alan Page Fiske (2011), “Moral Psychology Is Relationship Regulation,” *Psychological Review* 118(1), 57–75, p. 58. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/49764236_Moral_Psychology_Is_Relationship_Regulation_Moral_Motives_for_Unity_Hierarchy_Equality_and_Proportionality
- S55** Aida Ramezani & Yang Xu (2025), “Moral Association Graph: A Cognitive Model for Automated Moral Inference,” *Topics in Cognitive Science* 17(1), 120–138, §5.1. <https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11792775/>
- S56** Phan Minh Dung (1995), “On the Acceptability of Arguments and Its Fundamental Role in Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Logic Programming and n-Person Games,” *Artificial Intelligence* 77(2), 321–357, Definition 7, p. 327. <https://www.umiacs.umd.edu/~horty/courses/readings/dung-1995-acceptability.pdf>
- S57** Immanuel Kant (1785), *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Section I (shopkeeper example). https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Groundwork_of_the_Metaphysics_of_Morals
- S58** Shaun Nichols (2002), “Norms with Feeling: Towards a Psychological Account of Moral Judgment,” *Cognition* 84(2), 221–236. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0010-0277\(02\)00048-3](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0010-0277(02)00048-3)
- S59** Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953), *Philosophical Investigations*, §§65–67 (family resemblance). https://www.wittgensteinproject.org/w/index.php/Philosophical_Investigations
- S61** Fiery Cushman & Liane Young (2011), “Patterns of Moral Judgment Derive From Nonmoral Psychological Representations,” *Cognitive Science* 35(6), 1052–1075. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1551-6709.2010.01167.x>
- S62** Jay J. Van Bavel, Dominic J. Packer, Ingrid J. Haas, & William A. Cunningham (2012), “The Importance of Moral Construal,” *PLOS ONE* 7(11), e48693. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0048693>
- S63** Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Thalia Wheatley (2014), “Are Moral Judgments Unified?” *Philosophical Psychology* 27(4), 451–474, abstract (p. 451). <https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2012.736075>
- S64** Victor Kumar (2016), “The Empirical Identity of Moral Judgment,” *Philosophical Quarterly* 66(265), 783–804. <https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqw019>
- S65** Ram Neta (2015), “Basing Is Conjuring,” *Minds Online*. <https://mindsonline.philosophyofbrains.com/2015/session3/basing-is-conjuring/>
- S66** Ram Neta (2019), “The Basing Relation,” *The Philosophical Review* 128(2), 179–217, abstract (p. 179). <https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-7374945>
- S67** Kevin McCain (2012), “The Interventionist Account of Causation and the Basing Relation,” *Philosophical Studies* 159(3), 357–382, abstract (p. 357). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9712-7>
- S68** Kurt Sylvan & Errol Lord (2019), “Prime Time (for the Basing Relation),” in J. Adam Carter & Patrick Bondy (eds.), *Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation*, 141–173, authors’ abstract; §2.2, pp. 148–150. <https://philarchive.org/rec/SYLPTF>
- S69** Paul Silva Jr. (2015), “Does Doxastic Justification Have a Basing Requirement?” *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 93(2), 371–387. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2014.962553>
- S77** Stanislas Dehaene & Lionel Naccache (2001), “Towards a Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness: Basic Evidence and a Workspace Framework,” *Cognition* 79(1–2), 1–37, §6.2, p. 30. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0010-0277\(00\)00123-2](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0010-0277(00)00123-2)

- S78** Samuel L. Gaertner, Jeffrey Mann, Audrey Murrell & John F. Dovidio (1989), ‘Reducing Intergroup Bias: The Benefits of Recategorization,’ *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 57(2), 239–249, abstract, p. 239. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.57.2.239>
- S79** Jean-Philippe Laurenceau, Lisa Feldman Barrett & Paula R. Pietromonaco (1998), ‘Intimacy as an Interpersonal Process: The Importance of Self-Disclosure, Partner Disclosure, and Perceived Partner Responsiveness in Interpersonal Exchanges,’ *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 74(5), 1238–1251, discussion, p. 1247. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.74.5.1238>
- S80** C. Daniel Batson, Tricia R. Klein, Lori Highberger & Laura L. Shaw (1995), ‘Immorality from Empathy-Induced Altruism: When Compassion and Justice Conflict,’ *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 68(6), 1042–1054, abstract, p. 1042. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.68.6.1042>
- S81** Emmanuel Levinas (1961/1969; 1991 Springer edition), ‘Ethics and the Face,’ in *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, trans. Alphonso Lingis, p. 198. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9342-6_13
- S82** Eric Luis Uhlmann, David A. Pizarro & Daniel Diermeier (2015), ‘A Person-Centered Approach to Moral Judgment,’ *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 10(1), 72–81, abstract, p. 72. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691614556679>
- S83** Jonathan Haidt (2001), ‘The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment,’ *Psychological Review* 108(4), 814–834, central claim, p. 817. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.108.4.814>
- S84** Daniel Crimston, Paul G. Bain, Matthew J. Hornsey & Brock Bastian (2016), ‘Moral Expansiveness: Examining Variability in the Extension of the Moral World,’ *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 111(4), 636–653, abstract, p. 636. <https://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000086>

C. Secondary source records

- S12** Eric Mack (2026 revision), “Robert Nozick’s Political Philosophy,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, §2. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nozick-political/>
- S14** “Divine Command Theory,” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, §4d (secondary summary of Adams 1987). <https://iep.utm.edu/divine-command-theory/>

Governance note

Register IDs identify claim-specific evidence units. One publication may therefore appear under more than one ID when different passages support different comparisons. Repeated publications preserve evidence provenance; they do not count as independent publications. Quotations remain governed in the Source Register and are intentionally omitted from this bibliography.