NDT reader resources

Governed source index

Project bibliography

All sources referenced by the project’s governed comparison and provenance records, with a direct link for every entry.

One bibliography, two useful forms.
Search the governed source index below or download the same governing bibliography as a document.

Open master bibliography
77 linked sources

Complete linked bibliography

Every entry in the project’s governed source register is included, together with the 2024 manuscript housed in the earlier NDT source set. Repeated citations elsewhere in the project resolve to these records.

  1. S01Aristotle, De Motu Animalium, Part 7 (trans. Farquharson).
  2. S02David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 2.3.3.3, SBN 414.
  3. S03David Makinson & Leendert van der Torre (2007), “What is Input/Output Logic?”
  4. S04John R. Searle (1964), “How to Derive Ought from Is.”
  5. S05Phan Minh Dung (1995), “On the Acceptability of Arguments and Its Fundamental Role in Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Logic Programming and n-Person Games,” Artificial Intelligence 77(2), 321–357, Definition 20, p. 329.
  6. S06Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. I, §II.
  7. S07Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Formula of Humanity.
  8. S08W. D. Ross (1930), The Right and the Good, ch. 2, p. 28.
  9. S09Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Books I–II (trans. W. D. Ross).
  10. S10Virginia Held (1995), “The Meshing of Care and Justice.”
  11. S11T. M. Scanlon (1998), What We Owe to Each Other, ch. 5, p. 189.
  12. S12Eric Mack (2026 revision), “Robert Nozick’s Political Philosophy,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, §2.
  13. S13Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I–II, q.94, a.2.
  14. S14“Divine Command Theory,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, §4d (secondary summary of Adams 1987).
  15. S15Jonathan Dancy (2004), Ethics Without Principles, ch. 1, p. 7.
  16. S16Graham et al. (2011), “Mapping the Moral Domain,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 101(2), 366–385, quote p. 366.
  17. S17Schein & Gray (2018), “The Theory of Dyadic Morality,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 22(1), 32–70, quote p. 32.
  18. S18Elliot Turiel (1983), The Development of Social Knowledge: Morality and Convention, ch. 4, p. 61.
  19. S19Curry, Mullins & Whitehouse (2019), “Is It Good to Cooperate?”
  20. S20Rai & Fiske (2011), “Moral Psychology Is Relationship Regulation,” Psychological Review 118(1), 57–75, p. 58.
  21. S21Kleiman-Weiner, Saxe & Tenenbaum (2017), “Learning a Commonsense Moral Theory,” Cognition 167, 107–123, author manuscript p. 2.
  22. S22Friston et al. (2017), “Active Inference: A Process Theory.”
  23. S23Bai et al. (2022), “Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedback.”
  24. S24Hendrycks et al. (2021), “Aligning AI With Shared Human Values.”
  25. S25Bree Beal (2020), “What Are the Irreducible Basic Elements of Morality?”
  26. S26Bree Beal (2021), “The Nonmoral Conditions of Moral Cognition.”
  27. S27Beal & Gogia (2021), “Cognition in Moral Space: A Minimal Model.”
  28. S28Bree Beal (2022), “The Polyphony Principle.”
  29. S29Beal, B. L. (2018). Raskolnikov's Confession: A Dostoevskian Model of Moral Psychology [Doctoral dissertation, Emory University].
  30. S30Beal, B. (2025, January 20). The Is-to-Ought Model of Moral Cognition. Bree's Substack.
  31. S31Beal, B. (2025, January 31). On the Relation Between Moral Philosophy and Moral Psychology. Bree's Substack.
  32. S32Beal, B. (2026). A Thousand Ramanujans. Bree's Substack.
  33. S33Barbara Herman (1993), The Practice of Moral Judgment, ‘On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty,’ pp. 1–22, quote p. 21.
  34. S34Nomy Arpaly (2003), Unprincipled Virtue, ‘Moral Worth,’ pp. 67–116, quote p. 72.
  35. S35Julia Markovits (2010), ‘Acting for the Right Reasons,’ The Philosophical Review 119(2), 201–242, quote p. 202.
  36. S36Paulina Sliwa (2016), ‘Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93(2), 393–418, quote p. 393.
  37. S37Hart, H. L. A., & Honore, T. (1985). Causation in the Law (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.
  38. S38Richard W. Wright (1985), ‘Causation in Tort Law,’ California Law Review 73(6), 1735–1828, quote p. 1774.
  39. S39Joseph Y. Halpern & Judea Pearl (2005), ‘Causes and Explanations: A Structural-Model Approach. Part I: Causes,’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56(4), 843–887.
  40. S40Sydney Levine, Nick Chater, Joshua B. Tenenbaum & Fiery Cushman (2026), ‘Resource-rational contractualism: A triple theory of moral cognition,’ Behavioral and Brain Sciences 49, e133, manuscript p. 13.
  41. S41Aida Ramezani & Yang Xu (2025), ‘Moral Association Graph: A Cognitive Model for Automated Moral Inference,’ Topics in Cognitive Science 17(1), 120–138, quote p. 120.
  42. S42John L. Pollock (1987), “Defeasible Reasoning,” Cognitive Science 11(4), 481–518, p. 484.
  43. S43John F. Horty (2012), Reasons as Defaults, Oxford University Press, abstract.
  44. S44Mikhail Bakhtin (1984), Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, ed. and trans. Caryl Emerson, ch. 1, p. 6.
  45. S45J. L. Mackie (1977), Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, ch. 1, §2, p. 17.
  46. S46G. E. M. Anscombe (1957), Intention, §33, p. 60.
  47. S47Donald Davidson (1978), “Intending,” in The Essential Davidson, p. 132.
  48. S48David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 3.1.1.27, SBN 469–470.
  49. S49David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 2.3.3.8, SBN 417.
  50. S50Jonathan Haidt & Craig Joseph (2004), “Intuitive Ethics,” Daedalus 133(4), 55–66, p. 60.
  51. S51Graham et al. (2013), “Moral Foundations Theory: The Pragmatic Validity of Moral Pluralism,” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 47, 55–130, p. 63.
  52. S52Chelsea Schein & Kurt Gray (2018), “The Theory of Dyadic Morality,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 22(1), 32–70, p. 33.
  53. S53Elliot Turiel (1983), The Development of Social Knowledge: Morality and Convention, ch. 4, p. 64.
  54. S54Tage Shakti Rai & Alan Page Fiske (2011), “Moral Psychology Is Relationship Regulation,” Psychological Review 118(1), 57–75, p. 58.
  55. S55Aida Ramezani & Yang Xu (2025), “Moral Association Graph: A Cognitive Model for Automated Moral Inference,” Topics in Cognitive Science 17(1), 120–138, §5.1.
  56. S56Phan Minh Dung (1995), “On the Acceptability of Arguments and Its Fundamental Role in Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Logic Programming and n-Person Games,” Artificial Intelligence 77(2), 321–357, Definition 7, p. 327.
  57. S57Immanuel Kant (1785), Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Section I (shopkeeper example).
  58. S58Shaun Nichols (2002), “Norms with Feeling: Towards a Psychological Account of Moral Judgment,” Cognition 84(2), 221–236.
  59. S59Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953), Philosophical Investigations, §§65–67 (family resemblance).
  60. S60Bree Beal and Joshua Rottman (2024), Nonmoral Beliefs Beat Values (submitted manuscript).
  61. S61Fiery Cushman & Liane Young (2011), “Patterns of Moral Judgment Derive From Nonmoral Psychological Representations,” Cognitive Science 35(6), 1052–1075.
  62. S62Jay J. Van Bavel, Dominic J. Packer, Ingrid J. Haas, & William A. Cunningham (2012), “The Importance of Moral Construal,” PLOS ONE 7(11), e48693.
  63. S63Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Thalia Wheatley (2014), “Are Moral Judgments Unified?” Philosophical Psychology 27(4), 451–474, abstract (p. 451).
  64. S64Victor Kumar (2016), “The Empirical Identity of Moral Judgment,” Philosophical Quarterly 66(265), 783–804.
  65. S65Ram Neta (2015), “Basing Is Conjuring,” Minds Online.
  66. S66Ram Neta (2019), “The Basing Relation,” The Philosophical Review 128(2), 179–217, abstract (p. 179).
  67. S67Kevin McCain (2012), “The Interventionist Account of Causation and the Basing Relation,” Philosophical Studies 159(3), 357–382, abstract (p. 357).
  68. S68Kurt Sylvan & Errol Lord (2019), “Prime Time (for the Basing Relation),” in J. Adam Carter & Patrick Bondy (eds.), Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation, 141–173, authors’ abstract; §2.2, pp. 148–150.
  69. S69Paul Silva Jr. (2015), “Does Doxastic Justification Have a Basing Requirement?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93(2), 371–387.
  70. S77Stanislas Dehaene & Lionel Naccache (2001), ‘Towards a Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness: Basic Evidence and a Workspace Framework,’ Cognition 79(1–2), 1–37, §6.2, p. 30.
  71. S78Samuel L. Gaertner, Jeffrey Mann, Audrey Murrell & John F. Dovidio (1989), ‘Reducing Intergroup Bias: The Benefits of Recategorization,’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57(2), 239–249, abstract, p. 239.
  72. S79Jean-Philippe Laurenceau, Lisa Feldman Barrett & Paula R. Pietromonaco (1998), ‘Intimacy as an Interpersonal Process: The Importance of Self-Disclosure, Partner Disclosure, and Perceived Partner Responsiveness in Interpersonal Exchanges,’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74(5), 1238–1251, discussion, p. 1247.
  73. S80C. Daniel Batson, Tricia R. Klein, Lori Highberger & Laura L. Shaw (1995), ‘Immorality from Empathy-Induced Altruism: When Compassion and Justice Conflict,’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 68(6), 1042–1054, abstract, p. 1042.
  74. S81Emmanuel Levinas (1961/1969; 1991 Springer edition), ‘Ethics and the Face,’ in Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis, p. 198.
  75. S82Eric Luis Uhlmann, David A. Pizarro & Daniel Diermeier (2015), ‘A Person-Centered Approach to Moral Judgment,’ Perspectives on Psychological Science 10(1), 72–81, abstract, p. 72.
  76. S83Jonathan Haidt (2001), ‘The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment,’ Psychological Review 108(4), 814–834, central claim, p. 817.
  77. S84Daniel Crimston, Paul G. Bain, Matthew J. Hornsey & Brock Bastian (2016), ‘Moral Expansiveness: Examining Variability in the Extension of the Moral World,’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 111(4), 636–653, abstract, p. 636.